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Summary
With an increasing number of cloud providers offering services made use of by both
individual users and other providers, there is a realization that service provision now
involves an “ecosystem” of providers. Some providers may be directly visible to a user,
while others may be contributors to composite services and not directly known to
the user—as only the provider offering the composite service is visible. Such services
may include: domain specific services (eg, simulation), advertising services, or profil-
ing/analytics services. Understanding the impact on data privacy of a user for such
a composite service remains a challenge, and providing transparency (and obtain-
ing user consent for data use) remains a key requirement of the European General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). An architecture that makes use of blockchains
and smart contracts is proposed that addresses this requirement. An implementa-
tion of the architecture is used to demonstrate how access control can be managed
and audited. The scalability and cost of undertaking access control, as the number of
actors (both service providers and “voters”) increases, is also described. The proposed
approach can be used to support service aggregation across both private and public
clouds.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With increasingnumberof on-line services, oftenhostedover cloud infrastructure, there is a realization that such services can involve an interlinked
set of cloud providers. To access a service, users primarily interact through aWeb interface, and are (often) unaware of the larger collection of ser-
vices that aremade available behind theWeb interface, and deployed across a distributed infrastructure. Users entrust their datawithout realizing
that the providers may share their data with back-end services such as cloud hosted analytics and advertisers—the growth in Internet-connected
devices adds further complexity to this challenge. In order to address this, the general data protection regulation (GDPR) is implemented to impose
obligations on providers to ensure that consent is obtained fromusers before their data aremade use of, thereby enabling nonexpert users tomake
informed decisions about their privacy.1
The key elements introduced in GDPR are a data subject, a controller or joint controller, and a processor.2 The data subject is the data owner
and the controller a person/organization specifying aims of processing a user's personal data. The notion of joint controller is introduced where
two or more controllers jointly specify the purpose of data processing. Finally, the processor is responsible for processing personal data on behalf
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of a controller or joint controller.3 By defining these elements, GDPR gives the responsibility of any violation in data processing to the controller or
joint controller, but also gives a shared responsibility to the processor when the user has no direct control on the data (or the analysis carried out
on the data). The integration of GDPR into a cloud ecosystem helps make more explicit the responsibility and accountability requirements of both
the processor(s) and controller(s). Under such requirements, any operation of a cloud provider on personal data must be in accordance with user
consent.1
Given these GDPR requirements, several solutions have been proposed to support the accountability and provenance tracking of user data
when it is delivered to a controller or submitted to a processor.4 Some solutions utilize blockchain-based technologies to improve transparency
and trust between users and actors.4,5 In addition to these solutions, the blockchain as a shared ledger has been integrated into applications
that cover privacy, authentication, provenance, and data integrity.5 Blockchain technology has brought a provably secure, fully distributed,
and consensus-driven solution to these applications. A review of recent blockchain-based techniques to enhance privacy and trust in cloud
environment6,7 shows that the impact of such techniques on cloud-based service deployment has not yet been studied.
This articleproposesablockchain-basedapproach to improveprovenance trackingof clouduserdataunderGDPRrequirements. Themain con-
tributions of this work can be summarized as follows: (i) a service-oriented architecture that makes use of a blockchain network, to enable an audit
trail of service providers to be generated. The architecture supports trustable containers that securely log all provider operations on personal data;
(ii) ablockchain-based loggingmechanismto identifyproviderswhoviolateGDPRrules; (iii) a case study to showhowGDPRrules canbedeployedas
smart contracts in theblockchain—supporting access, transfer, andprofiling operations onuser data; (iv) performance evaluation showing the effect
of increasing the number of parties who verify provider operations, and the amount of gas (a metric used tomeasure the computational complexity
of carrying out the analysis) used for deploying smart contracts over a blockchain test network.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background material about blockchain and smart contracts. Section 3
describes the proposed architecture for supporting user privacy in a cloud computing environment, and Section 4 focuses on interac-
tions between the software components in the architecture. Section 5 includes a case study to illustrate how verification can be car-
ried out using a blockchain, with reference to GDPR rules. Section 6 provides experimental results describing the computational complex-
ity associated with carrying out the verification process. Related research work is reviewed in Section 7 and conclusions are provided in
Section 8.
2 BLOCKCHAIN BACKGROUND
A blockchain is a public ledger comprising of a distributed, shared database (storing records in blocks) and a set of connected nodes. The blocks are
structured as a chain, with each block containing a hash of its previous block. Each block also contains a time stamp and a nonce. The former shows
the creation timeof theblockand the latter is anarbitrarynumberused just once in a cryptographic communication.8 Thenodes in ablockchainhave
a peer-to-peer relationship and can build a new block of valid transactions via a mining process. The nodes creating the blocks are called miners.
Mining is a main concept of the blockchain throughwhich a block is made and attached to a blockchain network. To this end, several techniques are
currently available, namely, Proof ofWork (PoW), Proof of Stake (PoS), Proof of Importance (PoI), Proof of Space (PoSpace), and Practical Byzantine
Fault Tolerance (PBFT).3
A blockchain network can be public, federated, or private.9 In a public blockchain, everyone can participate and access blocks without any per-
mission (eg, Ethereum10). In the federated blockchain, the network is operated under the leadership of several organizations or groups, which limit
the type of user who can take part in the verification of transactions (eg, Corda11 and R312). Finally in the private blockchain, only one organization
has permission to create/verify blocks (eg, Monax13 andMultichain14).
A smart contract is executable code that runs on the blockchain and translates a usual contract between two or more individuals into a pro-
gram. A smart contract provides mediation between two parties so that it enforces them to follow the contract. Each contract can involve a set of
transactions that may alter the state of the blockchain, for example, Ethereum.10 Ethereum uses payments (referred to as “gas”) for deploying a
smart contract or executing transactions. Gas refers to a unit measuring the computational effort required to carry out operations in a smart con-
tract (associatedwith operation or opcodes in the contract).8,15 The gas is paid in Ether, being the cryptocurrency in Ethereumecosystemand allows
smart contracts to be executed.
3 PRIVACY-AWARE CLOUD ECOSYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE
Figure 1 shows the architecture, which has two general work flows: (i) service delivery and (ii) improving user privacy. The former offers a set of
services or composite services realizing user requirements. The latter proposes a blockchain-based technique for user data provenance tracking.
Theuser interfaceenables submissionofpersonal data tocloud-hosted services.Using the interface, auser canalso submitpreferences forverifying
GDPR rules on the operations executed by providers.
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F I GURE 1 A new architecture for privacy-aware cloud
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Service configuration
Cloud providers
actors: controllers/processors
3.1 Privacy and accessmanagement
This layer includes four components: service broker, agreement builder, container management, and blockchain network—enabling an audit trail of
provider operations to be stored in a blockchain network. Operations can be access, store, profiling, or transfer of user data. Any GDPR violations
are also flagged to the user through this layer.
Service broker— identifies services that match user requirements—providing the name, location, and address of the service provider to the
agreement builder component.
Agreement builder—acts as a broker to create a shared agreement between a user and provider(s). Given the operations to be executed on user
data, this component builds a smart contract to record information required for verifying operations underGDPR rules. The smart contract address
is sent to providers to be deployed on their containers.
Container management—launches and manages a container on the provider to get data from the provider and submit this to a blockchain net-
work. It deploys the smart contract supplied by the agreement builder for recording such data. The data may involve user and provider addresses,
the operations processed on user data (eg, access, transfer, profiling), and information for verifying operations underGDPR rules (eg, user age). Our
assumption is that containers are trusted and they record every operations executed on the user data.
3.2 Servicemanagement
This layer is responsible for discovering, building, and publishing cloud services (someofwhichmaybe an aggregation ofmultiple services). TheQoS
management component maintains details about cost, availability, and uptime associatedwith each service.
4 REALIZATION OF THE ARCHITECTURE
Interaction between components is realized using four phases. Table 1 describes the symbols used.
Phase 1: service discovery and composition—this phase identifies requested services or the development of composite services. A service broker
identifies providers involved in the offered services.
Phase 2: building a shared agreement—a protocol for the creation of a shared agreement (based on GDPR requirements) is illustrated in the
sequence diagramof Figure 2. This phase is activated by the agreement builder using service details provided by the service broker component. The
agreement builder confirms the identity of services requiring user data and sends a request to data controllers/processors (actors) about opera-
tions to be executedby themonuser data. The agreement builder thenwaits for consent of the data subject. Given operations and associatedGDPR
rules, the agreement builder then builds a smart contract—referred to as container_submission. The smart contract consists of a template for stor-
ing data in the blockchain. This component also determines a set of voters for verifying operations.1The voters are third parties connected to the
blockchain network and can give votes when executed operations do not comply with GDPR rules.
1The addresses of voters are accessible for the agreement builder.
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Notation Description
 A set of operations
𝛼i An operation executed by actor i
Deg(𝛼i) Degree of compliance for 𝛼i
Vi A voter
vi A vote by Vi
𝜃i A threshold defined by Vi
G𝛼 A set of GDPR rules related to operation 𝛼
rj The successful detection rate for the violation j
TAB L E 1 Summary of notation
send operations & personal data
operations & personal data
send consent(operations,user data)
signed consent
access container submission
report your availability
build container submission smart contract
check providers’ details
a:Data subject b:Agreement builder c:Controller/Processor d:Voters
loop
F I GURE 2 A sequence diagram for
building a shared agreement
Phase 3: logging data processing—operations on user data, recorded using the trusted container, are stored in a blockchain (based on the con-
tainer_submission smart contract). From Figure 3 the agreement builder requests personal data from the data subject, which is then forwarded
to the actors for processing. A container_submission smart contract is used subsequently by a container to log the data, and which facilitates the
verification process. On termination of data processing, a message indicating the finalization of the process is submitted to the agreement builder.
personal data
launch a container
access offered services
deploy container submission contract
add a block
store the log
termination
process personal data
personal data
send personal data
a:Data subject b:Agreement builder c:Controller/Processor d:Blockchain
F I GURE 3 Data recording in blockchain
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F I GURE 4 Verification using blockchain
deploy verification smart contract
examination
returned result
deploy voting contract
votes’ results
access container submission contract
a:Agreement builder b:Voters c:Blockchain
Phase 4: verification of the operations—this phase verifies (using voters) violation ofGDPR rules—as shown inFigure4. Voters deploy a verification
smart contract to check each operation for GDPR compliance (see Section 5). Once the agreement builder component receives a terminationmes-
sage, it sends the voters the address of container_submission contract to ensure that the executed operations conform to GDPR rules. The voters
deploy the verification smart contract to access the data already stored by the container in the blockchain.
During agreement development between data subject and actors, the former should be notified in advance about operations that will be exe-
cutedbyactors on their personal data.Not all data subjectsmaybe concernedaboutGDPRcompliance—asverifying anoperation is a costly process
and a part of such cost should be paid by the data subject.We therefore introduce degree of compliance to enable a data subject to associate a value
between [0,1] to each operation that will be executed on their personal data:
Definition 1. Let be a set of operations executed by actor(s) on personal data. A function Deg ∶  → [0,1] is defined to map the degree of com-
pliance for verifying the operations into a real number between 0 and 1. For an operation 𝛼i ∈  executed by actor i, the outputs Deg(𝛼i) = 1,0 <
Deg(𝛼i) < 1, andDeg(𝛼i) = 0 show full-compliance, partial-compliance, and noncompliance, respectively.
Each voter can also define a threshold for the verification of each operation, that is, if the degree of compliance of data subject for an operation
is greater than or equal to a voter's threshold, the operation is verified. The choice of a threshold is subjective and shows the interest of a voter for
verifying GDPR compliance. Defining such a threshold is independent of the degree of compliance determined by data subjects. Setting it too high
may limit the number of voters who engage. Setting it too lowmay not lead to an unuseful outcome. The degree of compliance can be considered as
an input of the container_submission smart contract. The voting results can be reported according to the degree expressed by the data subject and
the thresholds determined by voters. An actor is classified as a violator based on the following definition.
Definition 2. Let  = {V1,… ,Vl} be a set of voters and vj be a vote by Vj after verifying operation 𝛼i by actor i such that
vj =
{
1, if Deg(𝛼i) ≥ 𝜃j and 𝛼i violates G𝛼
0, otherwise
,
where G𝛼 is a set of GDPR rules related to 𝛼i, and 𝜃j is a threshold defined by Vj for verifying 𝛼i. Moreover, let m ≤ l be the minimum number of
acceptable votes for reporting a violation. The actor i is classified to be a violator if Σlj=1vj ≥ m.
5 CASE STUDY
Consider a composite service combining: Order creation, Payment, and Shipping16 services. A customer orders a product, ships it to a destination
address, and organizes the payment process using an online portal (see Figure 5). A provider should access a customer's personal data to carry out
the following data processing (operations): (i) Order creation service provider:should get the customer data: name, identification number, biometric
information, age, and contact details; (ii) Payment service provider: needs to access customer name, identification number, and bank account details
to handle the payment; (iii) Shipping service provider: requires the name and contact details of a customer. The provider remotely interacts with a
subcontractor (aMail service provider) to manage the product delivery. Given the roles defined in GDPR, both Order creation and Payment service
providers are processors and directly access customer data. The Shipping service provider, however, can have both processor and controller roles. It
acts as a processor when managing a part of data delivery and as a controller when transferring the data to the subcontractor. Finally,Mail service
provider is assumed to be a data processor.
It is assumed that a shared GDPR-based agreement has been reached between the customer and actors (controllers/processors). The agree-
ment is based on three GDPR rules: access, transfer, and profiling of customer data—where each actor must guarantee that (i) if customer data are
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Order creation
Shipping
Customer Payment
Mail
F I GURE 5 Composite service: e-commerce
sensitive, they provide an authentication control mechanism for preventing unauthorized access to customer data (Art. 32(1)(a) of GDPR); (ii) if
customer data are transferred to a processor located outside of Europe, the receiver must belong to a country following BCR rules (Art. 44-47 of
GDPR); (iii) automated profiling operations are not performed on data of customerswhose ages are below18 years (Art. 22 ofGDPR). The first rule
refers to a GDPR obligation for accessing customer data. In the case of sensitive data, services supplied by actors and delivered to customers need
to support encryption. The second rule refers to a GDPR obligation for transferring customer data in which the data receiver must be hosted in a
European member state or belong to a country certified by BCR clauses—essentially a code of conduct adopted by a community of multinational
companies thatwant tomove customer data internationally across various jurisdictions.17 The third rule forbids automated profiling operations on
customers whose ages are below 18 years.
Figure 6 provides an overview of smart contracts that must be deployed in accordance with the techniques proposed in phases 3 and 4. The
parties deploying these smart contracts are actors involved in delivering the composite e-commerce service, voters, and agreement builder. These
parties should be connected to the Ethereum network via a specific client interface.6 These smart contracts can be shared among them—as shown
in Figure 6.
Container_Submission
Access
personal data
auth_access
Transfer
country name
Profiling
customer age
Verification
Verify_Access
check sensitive data
check auth_access
Verify_Transfer
check country name
check BCR
Verify_Profiling
check customer age
Initial_Verification
check operations
check degree of compliance
Voting
Conclude
voter_1:address,...,voter_n:address
report vote result
Call
Call
F I GURE 6 Smart contracts and operations
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5.1 Container_submission smart contract
This smart contract is deployed at containers and has three functions: Access, Transfer, and Profiling. Each function gets necessary informa-
tion for verifying its related GDPR rule in the verification phase. The smart contract also enables customer to identify a degree of compli-
ance for verifying operations under GDPR rules. Access uses the boolean auth_access variable, to identify whether the service supplied
by the actor supports encryption of personal data or not; Transfer gets the country name of the provider receiving customer data; Profiling
requests the age of the customer whose personal data are under an automated profiling operation (eg, obtaining some statistical results on
customer data).
5.2 Verification smart contract
This smart contract is deployed by predefined voters to verify GDPR rules on actors. Each voter detects GDPR violation and sends out a message.
Four functions: Initial_Verification, Verify_Access, Verify_Transfer, and Verify_Profiling are used to implement this. Each function is implemented for the
verification of an operation executed by actors on customer data.2
Initial_Verification—For eachoperation executedby an actor, the function compares thedegreeof compliance of customer for verifying theoper-
ation and the thresholds determined by voters. If the former is greater than or equal to the latter, then it (locally) calls the function for verifying the
operation in the smart contract.
Verify_Access—the verification smart contract has a list of all sensitive data identified by the GDPR standard. For verification, personal data
loggedbyacontainer is comparedwithasensitivedata list. The log recordedbyacontainer is checkedto identify theauthenticationstatus.Providing
that authentication variable (auth_access) is false value, the actor accessing the customer data is identified to be a violator.
Verify_Transfer—checks the location of the data receiver, and if outside of Europe the function then checks the list of countries certified by BCR
country. If neither of thesematch, a GDPR violation is flagged.
Verify_Profiling—checks customer age via deploying container_submission smart contract. If the age is less than 18 years, then a violation is
flagged.
The approach proposed in Reference 3 can be used for translating the aforementioned GDPR rules into opcodes for use in smart contracts.
The approach focuses onmost frequently used operations, for example, access, data transfer, and so on. These operations are used to support data
processing (on personal user data) by service providers and their execution can be directly monitored and verified.
5.3 Voting smart contract
This smart contract isdeployedbytheagreementbuilderandcollects thevotes returnedbyvoters inorder tocheckwhetheraviolation is committed
by actors or not. The function of this contract—called here Conclude—gets the addresses of voters participating in the verification process. Given
Definition 2, if at leastm voters report a violation, the actor is reported.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
An initial prototype was built by Ganache18 and Ropsten,19 and smart contracts in Figure 6 were programmed in Solidity.20 The Ganache local test
network supplied default gas and Ether to alter blockchain states under the function calls. Ropsten is a public test network, supportingminers, and
with a gas limit of 4 712388 for deploying a contract. Remix Ethereumwasused as the framework to compile and rundeployed contracts. The smart
contracts container_submissionand verificationwere deployed on Ganache and Ropsten, respectively. The amount of gas used for the contracts was
773 721 for container_submission andwas 1 814 952 for verification.3The gas consumption for the deployment of voting smart contract depends on
the number of voters involved in the contract. The variation in the amount of gas consumed by changing the number of voters, and the variation in
gas used by changing the number of operations of actors are taken into account. Moreover, the impact of the deployments of voting contract with
different numberof voters on the (average) time taken for theminingprocess is evaluated.Whendetecting violations inGDPRrules identified in the
case study, experiments are carried out to show the rate of violation detection under different threshold levels determined by voters. Furthermore,
the relationship between the violation detection rate and the number of acceptable votes for reporting a violation is investigated with regards to
different diversity of voters' thresholds.
2The smart contract calls the container_submission contract to retrieve the information already sent by container to the blockchain.
3The gas price was 1 Gwei in our experiments.
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F I GURE 8 Number of operations vs gas consumption
Numberof voters vs gas consumption: Figure7shows the relationshipbetween thenumberofvotersand theusedgas spendingon thedeployment
of voting contract. In this experiment deployed in Ganache test network, the number of voters varies from one to eight. As seen from the figure,
when the number of voters increases, the amount of consumed gas increases constantly from 365 597 (one voter) to 723 608 (eight voters).
Number of operations executed by an actor vs gas consumption:We consider one actor andone voter,with number of operations (ie,Access,Transfer,
Profiling) executed by the actor varying from 1 to 10. Transaction costs for the verification of Initial_Verification function (with different
parameters) were repeated and measured five times to calculate the average used gas. In each activation, the operations, degrees of compliance,
and voters' thresholds were selected randomly. Given these assumptions, the relationship between the number of operations and the transaction
costs used for verifying them is shown in Figure 8. It can be seen from the figure that as the number of operations increases, the used gas varies from
42 503 (one operation) to 298 384 (10 operations).
Number of voters vsmining time: This experimentwasperformedon theRopsten test network, tomeasure the time taken fromthedeployment to
miningof a contract—repeated five times to calculate theaverage.Numberof voters in the contractwas altered fromone toeight. Figure9 identifies
the time taken (in seconds) for the voting contract to be successfully mined since its deployment time. Similar to Reference 21, our results indicate
that the timedependson the interest ofminers in thevoting contract anddoesnotdependon thenumberof voters or contract parameters. It results
that miners can normally take an arbitrary time for the process of mining.
Violation detection rates: the effect of changing voter thresholds on the rate of violation detection in the GDPR rules (from Section 5) is
measured—where a violation in a rule is based on the conditions proposed inDefinition 2.We consider nine actors (controllers/processors) and one
voter (with one operation per actor). Moreover, the data subject assigns a degree of compliance for verifying operations executed by actors. Voter
thresholds are set to 5, 7, and 94 FromFigure 10, the x-axis indicates the number of actorswho committed a violation, and the y-axis the rate of vio-
lation detection based on the voter's thresholds. For each threshold, the verification smart contract was activated 10 times to calculate the average
4Integer numbers are used as solidity does not support real numbers.
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rate of violation detection. In each activation, a random number between 0 and 10was generated to indicate the degree of compliance with GDPR
rules on the operation executed by each actor. Given such assumptions, the average rate of violation detection is calculated as:
∑n
i=1 ri
n
,
wheren is thenumberof violations (varies from1 to8) and ri is the averagenumberof successful detection for theviolation i.Whenavoter increases
its threshold for verifying operations, the average rate of violation detection decreases. The fluctuations are due to the random generation of com-
pliance degrees. We observe that changing the number of violations does not impact on the detection rate, as GDPR compliance of operations is
automatically verified and any violation is flagged when the threshold of voter is less than or equal to the degree of compliance required by a data
subject.
Violation detection rate vs number of votes: this experiment evaluates the impact of changing theminimumnumberof acceptable votes for report-
ingaviolationon theaverage rateof violationdetection.Theevaluation isdoneunderdifferent thresholds.Consideringeight actors, one is randomly
selected as a violator breaching a GDPR rule. Moreover, there are eight voters (with thresholds between 0 and 10), and the compliance degree of
data subject for verifying the rules is randomly chosen between 0 and 10. In the experiment, the diversity of thresholds for voters is assumed to be
4 and 8, that is, voters have 4 and 8 different thresholds for verifying operations, respectively. Regarding the eight voters involved in the evaluation,
every two voters have the same threshold. However, for the diversity of eight, each voter has a different threshold with the others.
As illustrated inFigure11, the x-axis shows theminimumnumberof acceptable votes to issueaviolation report. The y-axis indicates theaverage
rate of violation detection, calculated by the formula provided in the previous experiment with n=1. The smart contracts of the case study were
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F I GURE 11 Rate of violation detection vs accepted number
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deployed and executed 10 times to calculate the average rate of violation detection. From Figure 11, by increasing the number of acceptable votes
for reporting a breach, the average rate of violation detection declines gradually. It is also observed that a higher detection rate (or a more precise
violation detection) can be achievedwhen the number of thresholds used increases and the number of acceptable votes decreases.
7 RELATED WORK
Blockchain and smart contracts have recently motivated cloud security researchers to improve user trust and privacy for sharing data in cloud
ecosystem. The potential of using blockchain-based techniques to protect healthcare data located in cloud was described in Reference 22, high-
lighting practical challenges for recordingmedical data in a blockchain network.Moreover, the authors in Reference 23 presented a patient centric
healthcare data management system with the aid of blockchain. The system ensured that the private health-care data in cloud is only monitored
by patient. A blockchain-based approachwas proposed for storing cloud attestation in Reference 6. The authors implemented a smart contract for
recording the migration of user data between cloud providers. The deployment of the smart contract enabled cloud users to identify the location
of their data through the submission of a query to the contract—extended in Reference 24 to provide cloud users more control on the migration
of their data to providers in user-defined white lists. Consumer-based data movement policies realized through a blockchain-based technique was
reported in Reference 25. The authors in Reference 21 proposed an automatic way for tracking and enforcing data sharing agreements between a
user and cloud providers with the aid of smart contract and blockchain technology. In this approach, the providers who violated the shared agree-
mentsweredetected througha set of voters or arbiters listed in a voting contract. InReference26, a secure smart homearchitecturebasedoncloud
andblockchain technologywas proposed. The authors used an encryption andhashing algorithm toobtain confidentiality and trust. The integration
of blockchain-based approaches into several security services, including authentication, privacy, data provenance, and integrity are reviewed inRef-
erence 5. A conceptual model—called ProvChain—was designed to collect cloud data provenance and provide the assurance of data operations in
a cloud storage application through logging provenance data in a blockchain network.27 The integration of blockchain and attribute-based signcryp-
tionwas proposed in Reference 28 to support secure data sharing in a cloud ecosystem. Although the aforementioned approaches take advantages
of blockchain and smart contracts to enhance cloud user privacy and trust, none of them applied GDPR rules in their methods to clearly give some
standard regulations to the actors processing user data.
Work that combines blockchain and GDPR in a cloud environment includes a blockchain-based approach for supporting data accountability
and provenance tracking, which meets GDPR requirements proposed in Reference 4. The approach presented two different models for deploying
a smart contract: (i) data subject consent rules recorded in a blockchain under which each actor (controller/processor) should follow the rules and
(ii) actor policies supported as a smart contract that allows users as subscribers join or leave the contract. Verification to check for compliance of
consent rules was undertaken manually in both cases. A personal health data sharing system has been proposed in Reference 29, which enables
users to securely share their health data and for data consumers to get necessary data in a transparent manner and in compliance with GDPR.
The system used blockchain technology supplemented by cloud storage shares the health data. A data quality inspectionmodule relied onmachine
learning approaches was introduced in the system to monitor the quality of personal health data. Although the system benefits from GDPR and
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blockchain for improving the privacy of users' health data, it still lacks a methodology whereby the verification of stored data in the blockchain
network is supported. The authors in Reference 30 designed a conceptual and a high-level architecture for an identity management system that
provides control on personal data usage with the aid of GDPR. The architecture also utilized blockchain technology to supply transparency, trust,
and security. However, the validation and deployment of architecture in real-world applications was not discussed. A blockchain-based personally
identifiable information management system, called BcPIIMS, was proposed in Reference 31 so that storing personal data in the system complies
with GDPR rules. The verificationwas limited to the rule: right to be forgotten. The authors in Reference 32 took advantage of blockchain andGDPR
to develop a digital onboarding framework that defines security policies for users' identity attributes stored on multiple centralized repositories.
However, the verification of GDPR rules legislated for data transfer and profiling over the framework was not studied. Generally, though all these
approachesmake use of blockchain andGDPR to improve user privacy, they lack an automatic, transparent, and consensusmechanismunderwhich
GDPR violations are flagged. In Reference 33, a privacy-aware cloud architecturewas proposed to improve transparency and enable the audit trail
of providerswhoaccesseduser data throughblockchain. The core of architecture took the advantages ofGDPRand smart contracts to verifyGDPR
compliance.However, the smart contracts proposed for theverificationof providerswerenot evaluated. InReference3, the audit trail of IoTdevices
under GDPR rules was presented through which several GDPR rules were translated as opcodes in smart contracts to automatically protect IoT
user data. The verification of devices, however, was not undertaken by a consensus mechanism and the degree of compliance of users for verifying
operations was not studied.
8 CONCLUSION
A cloud-based architecture is proposed to enhance user privacy—using a blockchain-based technique in which GDPR requirements are supported.
The technique provides a reactivemechanism so that the providers violatingGDPR rules are detected—the likelihoodof detection increasing as the
voters increase in number (but at a high gas cost). In contrast to data provenance tracking approaches, where the blockchain network is manually
checked by users, the presence of voters in our approach provides an automatic verification approach. The degree of compliance enables data sub-
jects to trade-off GDPR rule checking vs the cost of performing such checks. Based on this concept, voters perform the verification process when
their thresholds were less than or equal to the degree of compliance of the data subject. A case study is used to illustrate the implementation of
smart contracts for checkingGDPR rules, for accessing, profiling, and transferring of user data in the cloud environment. Experimental results show
that violation detection rate increases when voters select lower levels of threshold. Future work will focus on a preventative approach, whereby a
smart contract does not allowproviders to process user data if an operation is likely to violateGDPR rules. Such a preventativemechanism can then
be compared with the reactive one proposed in this article in terms of performance, scalability, and trust. Translation of legal GDPR clauses into
rules that can be programmatically verified remains another challenge.
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